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ARGUMENT 
1. Judge Oddone does not seek a rule change. Judge Oddone seeks uniform 
application of the disqualification and extraordinary relief processes. 
The State has characterized Judge Oddone's argument as requesting both a rule 
change and a judicial disqualification exception to extraordinary relief cases. This 
characterization is incorrect. Judge Oddone simply seeks application of existing rules and 
case law to the disqualification and extraordinary relief processes. Judge Oddone believes 
that, in fact, a judicial disqualification exception has been created by the Utah Court of 
Appeals and this exception should be rejected. As stated in the original brief, the Utah 
appellate courts have consistently stated that extraordinary relief is not an available remedy 
when interlocutory appeal or review on final appeal is available. Despite this case law, the 
court of appeals has created an exception that allows judicial disqualification issues to be 
reviewed through extraordinary relief, even though these issues have been and can be 
addressed through appeal. In the original brief, Judge Oddone suggested that, if 
disqualification issues are to be reviewed through extraordinary relief, then a rule change 
would be the appropriate mechanism, rather than acting contrary to other extraordinary relief 
decisions and carving out a judicial disqualification exception. The State has thus 
misconstrued Judge Oddone's argument. 
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Since the filing of the original brief, counsel for Judge Oddone has recalled an 
additional case in which a litigant sought extraordinary relief review of a disqualification 
decision. In the unpublished decision of State v. Gibbons, petitioner Dale Moroni Gibbons 
sought review of a Third District Court judge's decision denying a motion for 
disqualification. Copies of the relevant documents in that filing are attached as the 
Appendix. The Utah Court of Appeals denied the petition, while conducting an independent 
review of the affidavit. 
The Court of Appeals has thus repeatedly determined that disqualification decisions 
can be reviewed through extraordinary relief. Judge Oddone questioned the propriety of this 
practice below, although it is admitted that the argument was not strenuously made, because 
of the Court of Appeals previous inclinations. This case provides this Court with an 
opportunity to decide whether the Court of Appeals' exception to extraordinary relief 
practice is appropriate and, if it is appropriate, what type of review should be conducted. 
2. Judge Oddone's decision was not simply a legal conclusion to be reviewed for 
correctness. 
The State has cited InreM.L.. 965 P.2d 551 (Utah App. 1998) for the proposition that 
review of the legal sufficiency of an affidavit of bias is a legal question. Judge Oddone does 
not necessarily dispute this conclusion when applied to reviewing disqualification decisions 
on appeal. However, when reviewing these decisions through extraordinary relief, if that is 
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to be the course of action, then appellate review cannot and should not simply be an exercise 
of offering a new interpretation of the affidavit of bias. 
Extraordinary relief review of a disqualification decision combines issues of law and 
fact. The appellate court can review the trial court judge's legal interpretation of what 
constitutes disqualifying factors for correctness, based on the proposition that those are legal 
questions. For instance, a judge's conclusion that disqualifying bias is only that which is 
extra-judicial can be reviewed for correctness. If a trial court is incorrect in its conclusion, 
a higher court could provide the correct interpretation. 
However, disqualification decisions are often fact intensive. The Code of Judicial 
Conduct is often explicit in its mandates, but the Code also provides only minimal guidance 
in some areas, such as what constitutes the "appearance" of bias. Judge Oddone asserts that 
this area often involves judgment calls that are entitled to deference. For instance, a trial 
court's determination as to whether alleged facts or statements create an appearance of 
impartiality is a discretionary call that would only be reversed if the appellate court, granting 
deference to the trial court's analysis of the facts, determined that the trial court grossly 
abused its discretion. If a trial court judge assesses facts in a manner that is inconsistent with 
precedent, in the form of judicial or ethics advisory opinions, that might constitute a gross 
3 
abuse of discretion. However, in judging unique facts, a trial court judge should be accorded 
deference. 
3. The State's final arguments validate Judge Oddone's concerns about 
extraordinary relief review of disqualification decisions. 
In the final pages of the State's brief, the State spends considerable effort explaining 
why Judge Anderson is biased against the Attorney General's Office and DCFS. The pages 
contain additional material that was not presented in the affidavit, such as evidence of 
additional federal court filings. Judge Oddone is placed in a difficult position with these 
arguments because it is not his role to argue against Judge Anderson's disqualification. In 
his order, Judge Oddone has set forth the support for his determination that the Attorney 
General's Office and DCFS did not meet their burden of showing disqualifying bias and 
prejudice. Judge Oddone cannot and should not otherwise argue about a colleagues alleged 
bias. 
Ultimately, Judge Oddone's primary interest is ensuring that he, as presiding judge, 
has the ability to assign all types of juvenile court cases to all of the judges assigned to his 
court. The Court of Appeals' decision has hampered his abilities, because of the blanket 
disqualification, and because of the lack of deference to his analysis and conclusions. Judge 
Oddone is a reluctant combatant against the State. Judge Oddone feels that, given the 
important administrative concerns raised by this case, a party such as the State must show 
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deep-seated, personal bias before disqualification is warranted. Judge Oddone believes that 
the State did not meet its burden of showing that Judge Anderson cannot reasonably handle 
State cases. If this court ultimately upholds the Court of Appeals' decision, Judge Oddone 
will accept the administrative consequences. Judge Anderson must separately manage the 
consequences of being disqualified. These are, in many regards, separate issues. 
As a final note, within the past few days, prior to the filing of this brief, this court has 
taken action that seemingly consolidates Judge Anderson's Judicial Conduct Commission 
proceedings with this case. This action places Judge Oddone in a difficult position vis-a-vis 
prior court precedent. In a disqualification case, the challenged judge is not to enter the fray 
by offering argument or comment about the basis for disqualification. The reviewing judge 
is to conduct a review based solely on the facts presented. Combining these cases may 
compromise that review. Having said that, Judge Oddone recognizes that the ultimate goal 
for the judiciary should be resolving Judge Anderson's ability to handle juvenile court cases 
involving certain individuals and entities parties. Whether that is accomplished through this 
case or the Judicial Conduct Commission case is of relatively little consequence to Judge 
Oddone. However, if this court seeks to address the facts concerning Judge Anderson's 
alleged bias or prejudice, beyond a review of Judge Oddone's and the Court of Appeals 
interpretation of 
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those facts, then Judge Oddone will respectfully decline to comment or argue further on that 
issue. 
Conclusion 
Judge Oddone is not asking for a rule change or special treatment. Disqualification 
issues are carefully addressed at the trial court level and can be adequately addressed on 
appeal. The trial courts should be given more deference at the extraordinary relief stage. 
Judge Oddone will not argue further about whether Judge Anderson is biased. Judge 
Oddone's analysis has been set forth in an order and that analysis will stand as the trial 
court's statement on Judge Anderson's alleged bias. 
DATED this _J_ day of July, 2003. 
Brent M. JohnsoryXttorney for 
Honorable Fredenc Oddone 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS Paillette Stagg 
Clerk of the Court 
ooOoo 
Dale Moroni Gibbons 
Petitioner, 
v. 
The Honorable Ronald Nehring, 
Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County; The Honorable J. 
Dennis Frederick, Third 
District Court, Salt Lake 
County, 
Respondents. 
Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Orme. 
Petitioner Dale Moroni Gibbons filed a Petition for 
Extraordinary Relief seeking an order compelling Respondent Judge 
Ronald Nehring, as Presiding Judge of the Third District Court, 
to enter an order disqualifying Judge Dennis Frederick from 
presiding over the trial in State v. Gibbons, Case No. 011909284. 
Respondents filed a response, and the State of Utah filed a 
limited response, which it said was intended to clarify the 
status of the criminal case. 
We determine the facts alleged in the Affidavit In Support 
of Motion to Recuse/Disqualify The Honorable Judge Frederick are 
insufficient to establish actual bias or an appearance of bias in 
which Judge Frederick's "impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned." Utah Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(E)(1). The 
allegations of the petition are also speculative. Insofar as 
there is any validity to concerns about Merrill Chandler 
testifying in the Gibbons case while under probation in a 
separate case also presided over by Judge Frederick, those 
concerns would be best addressed by Judge Frederick's recusal in 
Chandler!s case if proceedings for revocation of Chandler's 
probation are initiated. We further conclude that the factual 
allegations are insufficient to demonstrate any basis for calling 
Judge Frederick as a witness in the Gibbons case because they do 
not allege that the judge had any involvement in Chandler's plea 
agreement that is not reflected in the existing district court 
record. On the basis of the foregoing, 
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 
EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF 
Case No. 20020414-CA 
DARWIN OVERSON (7956) 
MARK FLORES (8429) 
CLAYTON SIMMS (8321) 
Law Office of Darwin Overson, LLC 
1366 East Murray Holladay Road 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
801-277-0325 / 801-277-0521 facsimile 
KRISTINE ROGERS (06978) 
Kristine M. Rogers' Law Office 
8 East Broadway #712 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
801-994-6000 / 801-994-6094 facsimile 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DALE MORONI GIBBONS, 
Petitioner, ] 
-vs-
THE HONORABLE RONALD 
NEHRING, Third District Court, ; 
Salt Lake County; THE HONORABLE, 
J. DENNIS FREDERICK, Third } 
District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Respondents. 
PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY 
) RELIEF PURSUANT TO RULE 
65B(d), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
) PROCEDURE AND RULE 19, 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE 
) PROCEDURE AND SUPPORTING 
MEMORANDUM 
Case No. £dO<£6<J/4-CA 
Dale Moroni Gibbons, ("Gibbons" or "Petitioner"), petitions the Court for 
extraordinary relief under Rule 65B(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 
19(c) of the Utah Rules of Appeliale Proceduie in the form of an order directing 
respondent to enter an order disqualifying the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick from 
presiding over the case of State of Utah v. Dale Moroni Gibbons, District Court No. 
011909284, Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah. The basis for the petition is set 
out more fully below. 
I STATEMENT OF AFFECTED PARTIES 
The affected parties in this action are the following: Honorable Ronald Nehring, 
respondent and presiding district court judge in the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake 
County; Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, district court judge in the Third Judicial District, 
Salt Lake County; and State of Utah, plaintiff in Gibbons. 
II RELIEF SOUGHT 
Petitioner seeks an order directing respondent Judge Nehring to enter an order 
disqualify Judge Frederick from presiding over further proceedings in Gibbons. 
III STATEMENT OF CASE 
Petitioner is charged with possession of methamphetamine, endangerment of a 
minor child, and distributing harmful material to a minor, all third degree felonies. The 
case was bound over to Judge Frederick after Gibbons waived his right to a preliminary 
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hearing.1 
On June 21, 2001, Gibbons' home was searched by Salt Lake County Sheriffs 
under the direction of case agent Detective Doug Lambert, ("Lambert"), who had 
previously secured a search warrant on June 18, 2001. Add "A ", Rule 29 Aff. at 6^21. In his 
affidavit in support of the search warrant Lambert relied on information he stated he 
received from informant Rian Wilson and other unnamed informants and that the 
information received from these informants was reliable and supported probable cause 
for the warrant. Add. "A ", Rule 29 Aff. at 6%2i & Rule 29 Aff Ex.Gatpp 7.002-09. Less than a 
month after Gibbons was charged, Lambert interviewed Merrill Chandler, ("Chandler"), 
an inmate at the Salt Lake County Jail, seeking information that would assist the State in 
the prosecution of Gibbons. Add "A ", Rule 29 Aff at 4^15 (Ex. Dot 131 & E). Lambert wrote a 
report of his interview of Chandler which attributed statements to Chandler that if true 
would tend to assist the State in meeting their burden at trial. Id. However, Chandler 
testified on April 15, 2002, before the Honorable Robin Reese, that he did not make most 
of the statements attributed to him by Lambert in the report and that Lambert exaggerated 
Gibbons waived his right to a preliminary hearing after adverse rulings relating to 
the timing and sequence of an evidentiary hearing on Gibbons' prosecutorial misconduct 
motion and his subpoenaing of prosecutor Sirena Wissler. See Add "A", Rule 29 Aff Ex. D -
Trans. April 11,2001 hearing before Hon. Robin Reese, at 31-33); Add C at 1-42 (Complete copy). 
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and misrepresented his words. Add. "A", Rule 29 Aff at 4^16 (Ex. Dpp 128-52.); compare Add. "C" at 
128-64 with Rule Aff Ex. E (lambert's report). 
Chandler was previously charged in three cases, District Court Case Nos. 
001917097, 001917099, and 001917104, ("Chandler cases"), with three first degree 
felonies with enhancements, a second degree felony, and six third degree felonies. Add. 
"A ", Rule 29 Aff at 2^5 (Ex A). Prosecutor Sirena Wissler, ("Wissler"), was the prosecutor 
who handled the three cases against Chandler. Add. "A ", Rule 29 Aff at 2%5 (Ex. A,B& C). She 
represented the State at the change of plea hearing and at sentencing, and during all plea 
negotiations between Chandler and the State, id. Each of the above identified Chandler 
cases were bound over to Judge Frederick, id. at 2%7. 
A plea agreement was reached in each of Chandler's cases identified above, and 
pursuant to that agreement Chandler entered guilty pleas to one first degree felony and 
two second degree felonies. Add. "A ", Rule 29 Aff at 2^8 (Ex B at 10). According to the 
transcript of Chandler's sentencing before Judge Frederick, part of the agreement with 
the State was that he cooperate with law enforcement in their investigations. Add "A", Rule 
29 Aff at 2^9 (Ex. Cat 9%^ 2-10). Chandler testified on April 15,2002 that he was ordered by 
Judge Frederick as a condition of his probation to cooperate with law enforcement in 
their investigations. Add. "A ", Rule 29 Aff at3%io (Ex. D at 157*^23-25). All plea negotiations, 
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entry of pleas and sentencing took place before Judge Frederick. Add "A", Rule 29 Aff. at 
5yi (Ex. B & Q. Judge Frederick sentenced Chandler to a term of imprisonment of five 
years to life on the first degree and one to fifteen years imprisonment on each of the 
second degree felonies. Add. "A ", Rule 29 Aff. at s%u (Ex. C at 12). The sentences were entered 
to run consecutively but were suspended and Chandler was placed on 24 months 
probation with one year to be served in the county jail id at 12 (Ex. C at 12-14). During the 
sentencing, Judge Frederick made it very clear to Chandler that he was quite willing to 
send Chandler to prison should he violate any of the terms of probation: 
I don't want you to delude yourself into thinking that you've bamboozled anybody 
here, because, quite frankly, Mr. Chandler, I was initially prepared to send you to 
prison; and I will do so at the drop of a hat. So you best not give me any reason to 
do it. Do you understand me? 
Add "A ", Rule 29 Aff. at 3y3 (Ex. C at 13^15-19). Just prior to making that statement, Judge 
Frederick ordered the condition of probation relating to cooperating with law 
enforcement: 
You are to cooperate with law enforcement authorities incident to other matters 
about which you have knowledge and the proposal you've made to make yourself 
available for educational purposes to other persons who are like minded, and that 
cooperation is to be forthcoming. 
Add "A ", Rule 29 Aff. at 3%13 (Ex. C at 13^1-5). According to his attorney, Chajudler was being 
asked as part of his agreement to cooperate with law enforcement to provide information 
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to Lambert "on an unrelated cases (sic) and as a potential witness in that case." Add. "A", 
Rule 29 Aff at 13 (Ex. Cat 9^2-10). According to Chandler's testimony, he was interviewed 
by Lambert. Add. "A ", Rule 29 Aff at 4%is (Ex. D at 131 & E). Lambert's report of the interview 
was produced it to the defense in discovery by Wissler. Add "A", Rule 29 Aff at 4%15 (Ex. E). 
Chandler testified before Judge Reese as follows: 
Mr. Flores: I'm going to ask you real quick. How do you feel about your 
appearance today? 
Mr. Chandler: Frankly, I'm bordering on nervous to scared to death. 
Mr. Flores: Why is that? 
Mr. Chandler: I have a current probation agreement with, on my case that 
says I'm supposed to cooperate with investigations for any 
law enforcement agencies. I believe I've done that in my 
interviews that I had with Mr. Lambert and yet the words that 
ended up on the paper were very different than the words that 
I gave and I feel that it might be interpreted by - my 
prosecutor is here and prosecuting this case, and I feel that I 
am extremely vulnerable for telling the truth here. 
Add. "A ", Rule 29 Aff. at 4^16 (Ex. D at 128 W0'21) (emphasis added). Chandler went on to rebut 
significant and material portions of the statements that had been attributed to him by 
Lambert in the police report. Add. "A ", Rule 29 Aff at 4%16(Ex.D at 132-152; compare Ex. E). 
On January 15, 2001, Wissler, Lambert and Gibbons' attorneys met in an attempt 
to resolve outstanding discovery issues. Add. "A", Rule29 Aff at 5^17(Ex. Fat 036B.010-017). 
During that meeting, one of the issues to be resolved was whether there were any 
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agreements of any kind with any of the witnesses or informants that were relied upon. 
Add. "A ", Rule 29 Aff. at 5%17 (Ex. F at 036B.010, ^015^46). Wissler and Lambert represented that 
there were no such agreements. Add. "A", Rule29 Aff. at 5%i7(Ex F036B.ois^46, 090.OIS%122, & 
087.0UV22). 
During the investigation of the Gibbons case, defense counsel learned that Wissler 
had entered into an agreement on behalf of the State with Rian Wilson, Add. "A", Rule 29 
Aff at 5%18, the named informant in the warrant affidavit executed by Lambert and 
approved and signed by Wissler. Add. "A", Rule29Aff (Ex. G). 
Contrary to the assertions of Lambert in the warrant affidavit, at the sentencing 
of Rian Wilson, before the Honorable Pat Brian on March 9, 2001, Wissler stated: 
Your Honor, / have had quite a bit of experience dealing with Mr. Wilson. When 
this case was originally brought against Mr. Wilson, we had negotiated a 
settlement which was to have involved Mr. Wilson providing information to law 
enforcement.... Unfortunately, Mr. Wilson made gross misrepresentations to 
both the State and its agents in the person of Salt Lake County Sheriffs detectives 
about this alleged information that he could provide.... A lot of information Mr. 
Wilson has provided to Adult Probation and Parole is not truthful.... He 
deceived law enforcement. He deceived me,.... 
Add. "A", Rule29 Aff at 5%20 (Ex H); Add. "D" (emphasisadded). The warrant affidavit was SWOrn 
and approved on June 18,2001. Add. "A", Rule29Aff ate^2i (Ex. "G"). 
Counts I & II of the information against the defendant in this case are based on 
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materials seized pursuant to the warrant supported by the above described affidavit of 
Lambert.2 Add "A", Rule29Aff. at 6^22. One of the defenses Petitioner asserts below is 
outrageous governmental conduct in the form of the sheriffs officer, with the assistance 
of the deputy district attorney, misleading the magistrate in order to secure the warrant. 
Add "A", Rule 29 Aff. at 6^23. Another component of that defense is that the State, in an 
attempt to cover up the prior misconduct, has resisted discovery by suppressing 
exculpatory evidence and falsifying police reports. Id 
Lambert's credibility will be a central issue at trial, and during many of the pretrial 
motion hearings, including a motion to suppress and a motion for a finding of 
prosecutorial misconduct, id at 6^24. At this time, the exact nature and terms of the 
State's agreement with Chandler are still unclear, id at <s%25. In order to establish what the 
nature and terms of that agreement were, the defense needs to interview Judge Frederick 
to find out if off-the-record representations or discussions occurred relating to the plea 
agreement. Judge Frederick is a potential witness in the Gibbons case, id at 6-7^25. 
Chandler's testimony is critical to the defense. Add "A", Rule29 Aff. at i%26. His 
testimony demonstrates that Lambert falsified his police reports and mis-characterized 
2Recently, the State has changed their theory as to Count HI and now intends to use 
materials seized from Petitioner's home to prove Count IE. 
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statements made by witnesses, id. 
A pre-sentence report was prepared and reviewed in the Chandler cases. Add. "A", 
Rule 29 Aff. at 7%28 (Ex. C at 3%22-23). That report presumably contained information as to 
Chandler's credibility, criminal history, family history, etc. as that is the purpose for the 
pre-sentence report, id. It likely included a statement of the nature and terms of the plea 
agreement. The pre-sentence report that is commonly used by judges to assess the person 
who has come before them to be sentenced, id The State has not produced the pre-
sentence report in discovery. 
Prior to April 3, 2002, Wissler and Lambert both maintained verbally and in 
writing that there were no agreements with any of the informants, including Rian Wilson 
-the named informant in the affidavit for search warrant. Add "A", Rule29 Aff. at 7%29 
(compare Ex. "F" at 087.011^122, 090.015^122 and 036B.015^46 with Exhibit "G" at 007.006-.008 and Ex. H 
at 1-3 and Ex. Dot 1-33 and Add "C" at 42-82,108-15). On April 11, 2002, Wissler reversed 
herself before Judge Reese and for the first time maintained that in fact there was an 
agreement and that Wilson only started to cooperate with law enforcement after his 
sentencing. Add "A",Rule29Aff. ai7-8^29(Ex. Hat 1-3; Ex.Dot 1-33; Ex. Got 007.008;Ex. Fat 
036B.oi4-.ois%40). Wissler's most recent position is inconsistent with her prior statement 
that all information was received in 2000, Id, and with Lambert's representation that he 
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spoke with Wilson in "mid to late November." Add. "A", Rule29 Aff. Ex. Fat 036B.ou-.ois\40. 
On April 11, 2002, Gibbons waived his right to a preliminary hearing and Judge 
Reese reserved jurisdiction for the purpose of preserving the testimony of Chandler, 
Wilson and Ryan Morgan. Add. "A ", Rule 29 Aff. Ex. D at 31-33. Wilson and Morgan each 
testified on April 11, 2002 that they did not make the statements Lambert had attributed 
to them in his affidavit for the warrant. Add "A ", Rule 29 Aff. at 4%16 (Ex. D at 132-52; Ex. E); Add. 
"C" at 42-80,107-116. Ryan Morgan, according to the State's Response to Petitioner's 
prosecutorial misconduct motion, was one of the confidential informants relied upon by 
Lambert in the warrant affidavit. Add. "E" at 12 (State's Responsettl 1) (identifying Ryan Morgan for 
the first time as an informant). Chandler testified on April 15, 2002 and at the end of his 
testimony, Judge Reese relinquished jurisdiction to Judge Frederick. Add. "C" at 39. 
Darwin Overson, Petitioner's attorney, filed a Rule 29 affidavit of bias or 
prejudice, a motion to disqualify Judge Frederick, supporting memorandum, and 
certification that the motion was brought in good faith, hM I (>n May 3, 2002, Judge 
Frederick certified the case for review by Judge Nehring. id. On May 24, 2002, by 
written decision, Judge Nehring denied the motion to recuse Judge Frederick. Id. No 
hearing on the issue was had. 
IV WHY NO OTHER PLAIN, SPEEDY OR ADEQUATE R E M E D Y EXISTS 
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Petitioner has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to him other 
than an order of this Court. Extraordinary relief is available where the petitioner has "no 
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy." U.R.C.P. RULE 65B(a); see also U.R.APP.P. 
RULE 19(b)(4); State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918, 921 (Utah App. 1998). There is no other 
plain, speedy and adequate remedy because (1) Rule 29 only permits the filing of one 
affidavit in a single proceeding; (2) If Merrill's testimony is shaded as a result of the 
circumstances that exist, it permanently tarnishes his testimony in later proceedings; (3) 
If Judge Frederick's decision is tainted by prior, preformed opinion stemming from the 
Chandler cases, there is no way to determine that on appeal because this Court will defer 
to the trial court's determination of credibility; (4) The complications presented by the 
Chandler testimony are likely to taint the suppression hearing and other pretrial motions 
impacting Petitioner's right to privacy and his First Amendment rights; (5) The integrity 
of the judiciary will be tarnished in the eyes of the public; (6) The Petitioner's right to 
investigate his case, call witnesses on his behalf, to a fair trial, to an impartial fact finder 
and to due process of law will be denied; (7) An important issue to the management of 
the judicial system will be avoided on review because a different standard applies after 
conviction; and (8) If Judge Frederick finds Chandler not truthful and ultimately revokes 
probation, Judge Frederick will lose jurisdiction in the Chandler cases and the error 
11 
cannot be corrected on appeal, which will likely leave Chandler embittered toward 
testifying again. 
A. Only One Rule 29 Per Case 
Rule 29 limits a party's ability to raise bias and prejudice to once in a proceeding. 
U.R.Cr.P. Rule 29(c)(C) ("No party may file more than one motion to disqualify in an 
action."). In the event that during the Gibbons case, facts develop that make it necessary 
for Judge Frederick to testify, Petitioner is barred by Rule 29 from raising that issue a 
second time. 
B Permanent Tarnishing of Merrill's Testimony 
Should Merrill shade or alter his testimony as a result of the presence of Judge 
Frederick and Wissler in the Gibbons case acting as a continuous reminder of the 
precarious position he faces, his testimony will permanently be tainted. The remedy of 
reversal on appeal will not wash the taint away. Merrill is an incredibly important 
witness to Petitioner's case and any impermissible tainting of his testimony causes 
irreparable harm to Petitioner's case. 
C Appellate Court Deference To Trial Court Determination 
It is within Judge Frederick's broadest discretion to make a determination, after 
hearing all the evidence, that Chandler is not telling the truth, that he is not credible. 
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This Court on review, should there be a conviction, would be bound by a long line of 
cases to defer to Judge Frederick's assessment of Chandler's credibility. See State v. 
Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153, 154 (Utah App. 1989) (unless clearly erroneous, appellate court 
defers to trial court's determination of witness's credibility); Harter v. Sorensen, 67 P.2d 
1062, 1063 (Utah 1902) (trial judge, "having the witnesses before him, can observe their 
deportment upon the stand, and is therefore in a better position to judge their credibility 
and the weight of the evidence than are the judges of the appellate courts."). The 
practical effect is that there is no review of the trial court's credibility determinations 
unless they are clearly erroneous. Should Judge Frederick's prior credibility 
determination of Chandler impact his credibility determination in Gibbons, there will be 
no effective way to review it on appeal. 
D. Impact On Privacy And First Amendment Rights 
During the search of Petitioner's home, officers seized a number of materials from 
the Petitioner's master bedroom which qualify for the strictest protections under the law 
of privacy and free expression. Should Petitioner be entitled to suppression and return of 
these materials, and as a result of the complication Chandler's testimony presents in front 
of Judge Frederick, should his motion be denied in error, Petitioner's right to privacy and 
expression will be irreparably harmed. The materials seized are of the quality and nature 
13 
that they should not be made part of the public record at trial unless they are evidence of 
the commission a crime-which they are not. They are merely evidence that Petitioner has 
a sex life. Government's undue intrusion into this area of Petitioner's life followed by 
putting his sex life on public display is incongruent with the teaching of the United States 
Supreme Court in privacy cases and First Amendment cases. These materials were 
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment and Article I Section 14 11( ihe 1 Nail 
Constitution, and Petitioner will show during the pretrial suppression hearing that he is 
entitled to the suppression and return of those materials provided he is given a fair 
opportunity to do so. 
E. Integrity Of The Judiciary 
Rule 29 is a procedural mechanism put in place to protect not only the party 
seeking disqualification, but also to protect the integrity of the judiciary. There is strong 
evidence that the prosecutor and lead detective acted outside of the law in order to 
prosecute Petitioner. The evidence that the detective misrepresented facts as to the 
reliability of informant Rian Wilson and that the prosecutor may have assisted him in 
doing so casts a troubling shadow on our criminal justice system. Should Judge 
Frederick be permitted to remain as trial judge over the case, it is likely to be perceived 
by the public, or significant portions thereof, as an indictment of our system. That is not 
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to say that Judge Frederick will in fact act inappropriately, but rather that it might be 
perceived that he has done so. Under the circumstances of this case, which has received 
extensive news coverage from coast to coast, the integrity of the judiciary is likely to be 
tarnished should Judge Frederick remain as the trial judge in Gibbons. 
F. Petitioner's Rights Denied 
Petitioner has a fundamental right to investigate his case, to call witnesses on his 
behalf, to an impartial decision maker, to a fair trial and to due process of law. He will 
be denied the opportunity to inquire of Judge Frederick as to his knowledge of the nature 
and terms of the plea agreement between Chandler and the State. The record of the 
proceedings is no substitute. There likely was an off-the-record discussion. The State's 
representations cannot be relied upon in this respect as the State spent ten months lying 
to the defense in the representation that there were no agreements with informants and 
witnesses when in fact there were such agreements. The objective record in this case 
bears that out to be true. Should it ultimately be necessary to call Judge Frederick as a 
witness, Petitioner will either be denied the opportunity to do so, or his trial will be 
significantly delayed during the period another trial judge is brought in. As stated more 
fully below, the Petitioner's right to an impartial decision maker will also be severely 
impacted by Judge Frederick remaining the trial judge. Such a wholesale denial of 
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constitutionally protected rights harms the Petitioner in such a complete manner that 
there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy for such harm. 
G. Conclusion 
If Judge Frederick determines Chandler is or is not credible and part of that 
determination is based on his prior assessment of Chandler in the Chandler cases, there is 
no plain, speedy and adequate remedy to correct that error because the reviewing court 
on appeal will defer to Judge Frederick's credibility determinations. By extension, there 
is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy for the abuse of discretion and error of law 
committed by Judge Nehring in failing to disqualify Judge Frederick from presiding over 
the Gibbons case. 
V ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether Judge Nehring applied the correct standard in prospectively 
reviewing the Rule 29 affidavit is a question of law reviewed for correctness. See State 
v. West 34 P.3d 234 (Utah App. 2001). 
2. Whether the Rule 29 affidavit is "legally sufficient" is a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. In re ML., 965 P.2d 551, 556 (Utah App. 1998); see V-1 Oil 
Company v. Dept. of Environmental Quality, 939 P.2d 1192 (Utah 1997); State v. 
Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975, 979 (Utah 1998). 
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3. Whether the reviewing judge has any discretion in granting or denying a 
motion to disqualify when the Rule 29 affidavit is legally sufficient is a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. Alonzo, 973 P.2d at 979. 
VI AT THE STATE'S URGING. JUDGE NEHRING APPLIED A STANDARD 
OF REVIEW THAT IS NO LONGER THE LAW AND DID NOT 
FOLLOW THE PROCEDURES FOR REVIEW OUTLINED IN RULE 29 
OF THE U.RCr.P. 
While Judge Nehring did not state what standard he employed in reviewing the 
Rule 29 affidavit in Gibbons, it is clear from the written decision that he applied either 
the retrospective due process standard or the repealed Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, 
Canon 3(C)(1) standard. See Add "B" (Nehring, Order at 1-6). Doing so was contrary to this 
Court's teachings in State v. West 34 P.3d 234, 234 (Utah App. 2001), and the 
command of Canon 3(E)(1). It also appears that Judge Nehring did not follow the 
procedure outlined in U.R.Cr.P. Rule 29, as mat rule requires the affidavit be reviewed 
and that the reviewing court make conclusions of law. Judge Nehring also erred by not 
holding a hearing prior to his decision. 
A. JUDGE NEHRING FAILED TO APPLY THE LEGAL STANDARD 
Judge Nehring's written decision does not state whether he reviewed the legal 
sufficiency of the Rule 29 affidavit under the standard set forth by Canon 3(E)(1) and by 
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this Court in West or by some other standard. Add. "B" (Nehring, Order 1-6). It is clear from 
Judge Nehring's decision that he did not review the legal sufficiency of the affidavit 
under the Canon 3(E)(1) standard. At no point in Judge Nehring's decision is there a 
statement as to whether a reasonable person, under the circumstances, might question 
Judge Frederick's impartiality. No conclusions are drawn as to appearances of bias or 
prejudice. Judge Nehring's sole focus was on whether actual bias ami prejudice had 
been proven when it should have been on whether a reasonable person might question 
Judge Frederick's impartiality, and whether there was an appearance of bias or prejudice. 
See §VI(D) & (G), infra at 24-27, 30-33. 
It is clear from the decision that Judge Nehring failed to follow the standard of 
review established by Canon 3(E)(1), West State v. Neelev, 748 P.2d 1091, 194 (Utah 
1988). That was clearly a misinterpretation of well established law, see Tolman v. Salt 
Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 27 (Utah App. 1991), and a failure to regularly 
pursue his authority. U.R.CR.P. RULE 65B(d)(4). 
While in Neelev the Utah Supreme Court required a showing of actual bias or 
prejudice to reverse a conviction or verdict based on a judge's failure to recuse himself, 
subsequent Utah appellate decisions have consistently made clear that "actual bias need 
not be found to support disqualification" prior to trial Madsen v. Prudential Federal 
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Savings and Loan Assoc, 767 P.2d 538, 544 n.5 (Utah 1988); Alonzo. 973 P.2d at 979 
(citing Neelev and Canon 3(C)(1) for proposition that judge should disqualify himself 
where his "impartiality might reasonably be questioned"); State v. Gardner. 789 P.2d 
273, 278 (Utah 1989) O'udge should recuse himself if there is an appearance of bias and 
canons of judicial ethics state that judge should disqualify if impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned); State v. Peterson, 810 P.2d 421, 427-28 (Utah 1991) (judge 
should have recused himself on own motion due to colorable claim of prejudice). 
The Supreme Court in Neelev strongly recommended "the practice that a judge 
recuse himself where there is a colorable claim of bias or prejudice..." 748 P.2d at 
1094. The Court explained that the standard created by Canon 3(C)(1)(b) "should be 
given careful consideration by the trial judge. It may require recusal in instances where 
no actual bias is shown [T]he integrity of the judicial system should be protected 
against any taint of suspicion." Id. 
The Neelev Court's recommendation became mandatory with the adoption of 
Canon 3(E)(1). All Utah appellate decisions addressing the issue of disqualification 
prior to State v. West were decided under Canon 3(C)(1), the predecessor to Canon 
3(E)(1). Under the prior version, disqualification was discretionary. However, since the 
adoption of Canon 3(E)(1) and this Court's decision in West il is absolutely clear that 
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the obligation to disqualify is mandatory. The law is plain in this regard: "A judge shall 
enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where.. .." CANON 
3(E)(1) (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, the standard Judge Nehring should have focused upon but did not 
was whether based on all the allegations in the affidavit, a person might reasonably 
question whether Judge Frederick was impartial. Instead, Judge Nehring focused 
exclusively on whether actual bias had been proven by Petitioner. The burden Judge 
Nehring placed on Petitioner in this regard was wholly inappropriate and a clear error of 
law. Due to the limited time frame in which to raise the issue of disqualification under 
Rule 29, it is unrealistic to expect a party seeking disqualification to present direct 
evidence for every reasonable inference that may be drawn from the facts attested to in 
the affidavit. This is doubly true when there is no requirement that actual bias be shown. 
Furthermore, because the issue may be raised at any time in the proceedings, a party may 
not have access to all of the facts, but only enough to give rise to the obligation to raise 
the issue. By denying Petitioner's request for disqualification on the grounds that 
Petitioner had not provided any evidence of an off-the-record discussion, Judge Nehring 
acted unreasonably and against the plain dictates of Rule 29 and Canon 3(E)(1). 
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B. JUDGE NEHRING FAILED TO REVIEW THE AFFIDAVIT AND 
A TTA CHED RECORD 
Judge Nehring's written decision acknowledged that Judge Frederick had 
submitted Petitioner's "Motion" to disqualify for the purposes of review. Add. "A" (Nehring, 
Order at l). It is, however, not clear from the written decision whether the Rule 29 
affidavit and attachments were forwarded to Judge Nehring since the decision only refers 
to the motion, and it is unclear whether Judge Nehring reviewed the affidavit and the 
attachments thereto. Judge Nehring wrote: "This case was bound over to Judge 
Frederick after the Honorable Robin Reese concluded, after preliminary hearing, that 
sufficient probable cause existed to support the prosecution of Mr. Gibbons " Add. 
"A " (Nehring, Order at l) (emphasis added). Copies of the relevant portions of the April 11 * and 
15th hearings before Judge Reese were attached as Exhibit "D" to the Rule 29 affidavit. 
A cursory review of that transcript reveals that Gibbons waived his right to a preliminary 
hearing in light of adverse rulings relating to Judge Reese's willingness to hear the 
prosecutorial misconduct motion prior to the preliminary hearing. Contrary to the 
finding of Judge Nehring, there simply has been no judicial finding with regard to 
probable cause to bind Petitioner over to the District Court. That Judge Nehring wrote in 
the decision that there had been a preliminary hearing and a finding of probable cause 
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strongly suggests that Judge Nehring did not review the Rule 29 affidavit and attached 
record in determining legal sufficiency. 
In referring to the agreement between the State and Chandler, Judge Nehring 
wrote: "Under the terms of Mr. Chandler's plea agreement, which was approved by 
Judge Frederick, Mr. Chandler agreed to cooperate with law enforcement. The 
cooperation expected of Mr. Chandler concerns the communication of information 
relevant to the State's prosecution of Mr. Gibbons which Mr. Chandler is believed to 
possess." Add. "B" (Nehring, Order at 2) (emphasis added). Judge Nehring either failed to review 
the Rule 29 affidavit or seriously misconstrued the record. Judge Nehring apparently did 
not grasp that the issue was not whether Chandler would provide such information in 
cooperation with law enforcement, but rather that he had already provided such 
information and the only issue was whether Lambert misrepresented that information. 
This is apparent by Judge Nehring's use of the terms "expected" and "is believed to 
possess" and by his referring to Chandler on page 5 of the decision as an "anticipated 
witness." It appears Judge Nehring did not realize that Chandler had already testified 
once in the case that he was "bordering on nervous to scared to death" and felt 
"vulnerable for telling the truth" because he was on probation with Judge Frederick, and 
Wissler, who is the lead prosec iiini in (he Gibbons case, was the prosecutor in his case. 
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Judge Nehring did not acknowledge in his decision that Chandler had in fact already 
expressed his apprehension in testifying. 
C. JUDGE NEHRING FAILED TO MAKE CONCLUSIONS 
OF LA W ON CRITICAL ISSUES RAISED 
Judge Nehring's decision failed to resolve several of the legal issues that were 
raised by the parties and that were necessary to his determination as to whether Judge 
Frederick must be disqualified. See Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 
31-32 (Utah App. 1991) (abuse of discretion found where administrative body rendered 
conclusions and decision without addressing legal issues raised by petitioner). For 
instance, the parties were in dispute over the appropriate standard to apply for 
determining legal sufficiency. Add "A". The State argued for application of the 
discretionary standard employed in Neeley, which was a retroactive review decided prior 
to the adoption of Canon 3(E)(1), and wrongly asserted that the "proper standard to apply 
to determine whether a judge should be disqualified is found in the Utah Code of Judicial 
Conduct Canon 3(E)(1) and advises, 'a judge should recuse himself when his 
"impartiality" might reasonably be questioned.'" Add. "A" (State's Opposition Memo at 3) 
(emphasis in original). The Petitioner argued for application of the mandator/ standard 
employed in West created by Canon 3(E)(1): "A judge shall enter a disqualification in 
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a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Add. "A" 
(Memo In Support at 8; Submission ofSupp. Authority at 7- 2; Reply at 4-10) (emphasis added). Judge 
Nehring failed to make a legal determination as to which standard he should apply. 
D. VARIOUS STANDARDS OF REVIEW FOR RULE 29 
AFFIDAVIT OF BIAS 
Judge Nehring wrote in his decision that the "primary thrust of defendant's claim 
of bias is that Judge Frederick has the wherewithall (sic) to exercise such a degree of 
'control' over Mr. Chandler that Mr. Chandler will inevitably shape his testimony to 
conform to his notion of Judge Frederick's interpretation of Mr. Chandler's obligation to 
'cooperate with law enforcement.'" Add "B" (Nehring, Order at 2). Judge Nehring apparently 
believed the standard required Petitioner to prove "inevitability" when in fact, all the 
Petitioner was required to show in order to be entitled to disqualification under the due 
process standard was "substantial risk". Again, it is not clear what standard Judge 
Nehring applied, but Petitioner was not required to meet the due process standard in 
order to show Judge Frederick must be disqualified. All that was required was a showing 
that impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Thus, the only question under that 
standard is whether a reasonable person might question the judge's impartiality. If so, 
the judge must be disqualified. 
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Determining which of the several standards to apply turns on several factors, 
including the source of authority, the nature of the proceeding, the interests that will be 
affected, the risk of erroneous depravation of that interest, and whether the review is 
taking place prospectively or retrospectively. See V-l Oil Co. v. Dept of 
Environmental Quality, 939 P.2d 1192, 1197 (Utah 1997) (due process standard applied 
in administrative proceedings); West 34 P.3d 234, 234 (Utah App. 2001) (prospective 
review under Canon 3(E)(1) in criminal prosecution); State v. Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 611 
(Utah App.) (actual bias standard in criminal prosecution reviewed retrospectively), 
affirmed 973 P.2d . 975 (1998). 
i Due Process Standard 
The Utah Supreme Court explained in V-l Oil Co., 939 P.2d at 1197, that even 
absent statutory or rule authority, due process principles require a certain level of 
protection against a decision maker's partiality. In determining whether due process 
requires the decision maker in an administrative proceeding be disqualified, the Court 
provided the following guidance in determining the standard to apply: 
The requirements of due process depend upon the specific context in which they 
are applied because "unlike some legal rules due process is not a technical 
conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances."... 
Determining the requirements of due process in any given context involves a 
balancing of three factors: 
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first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, 
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures 
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional safeguards; and finally 
the Government's interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens 
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 
Id at 1196 (citations omitted) (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335). The Court, after 
comparing the administrative proceedings to criminal proceedings and noting the 
heightened due process concerns in the later, held that in the former context where "a 
party to an adversarial proceeding can demonstrate actual impermissible bias or an 
unacceptable risk of impermissible bias on the part of a decision maker, the decision 
maker must be disqualified." Id at 1197 (emphasis added). Contrary to Judge 
Nehring's decision, Petitioner's Rule 29 affidavit satisfies this standard by demonstrating 
an unreasonable risk of impermissible bias or prejudice. 
li Prospective Review Standard 
In the context of a criminal prosecution prior to retrial, this Court in West 34 P.3d 
at 234, found that based on the authority of U.R.Cr.P. Rule 29 and U.CJ.C. Canon 
3(E)(1), the correct standard for prospective review of an affidavit of bias is that a "judge 
shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might 
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reasonably be questioned."3 Id. (emphasis added). This standard, to be used for 
prospective review, is considerably lower than the standard dictated by due process 
considerations post conviction. West, 34 P.3d at 234 (citing Ajonzo, 932 P.2d at 611). 
The effect of the lower standard created by Canon 3(E)(1) is greater protection for 
judicial integrity and fewer due process claims on appeal and in post-conviction cases. 
When judging Petitioner's Rule 29 affidavit against this standard, it is clear that Judge 
Frederick should have been disqualified. 
in Retrospective Review Standard 
Under the more rigid retrospective standard, a criminal defendant on appeal after 
conviction must show actual bias under an harmless error analysis. State v. Neeley, 748 
P.2d 975 (Utah 1998). Petitioner was not required to meet this standard. 
iv The Proper Standard In This Case 
Accordingly, the proper standard for reviewing a Rule 29 affidavit of bias prior to 
trial is that a "judge shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the judge's 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned." It is under this standard that the affidavit 
3This Court noted in West that in Neelev, 748 P.2d at 979, the Utah Supreme 
Court relied on Canon 3(C)(1), which employed the term "should" rather than the term 
"shall" employed by Canon 3(E)(1), which took effect on April 1, 1997. Both Alonzo 
and Neelev were decided at the trial level under the prior version. 
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in Gibbons must be judged when assessing its "legal sufficiency". Under this standard, 
the challenged judge and the reviewing judge have little discretion whether to enter an 
order of disqualification when the facts sworn out in the affidavit show that the judge's 
"impartiality might reasonably be questioned." That is, if the facts sworn to in the 
affidavit show impartiality might reasonably be questioned, the affidavit is "legally 
sufficient" as a matter of law and the challenged judge must be disqualified. Judge 
Nehring did not apply this standard or else he would have disqualified Judge Frederick 
since given the facts sworn in the Rule 29 affidavit of bias, Judge Frederick's impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned. See cases cited infra at 39-40. 
E JUDGE NEHRING MISPERCEIVED PETITIONER'S 
CONCERNS AS A PERSONAL ATTACK ON JUDGE 
FREDERICK WHEN THAT WAS NOT THE CASE 
Judge Nehring wrote in his decision as follows: 
I reject defendant's premise that Mr. Chandler's obligation to cooperate 
with law enforcement is incongruent with a duty to tell the truth. 
Defendant's assumption that Judge Frederick would terminate Mr. 
Chandler's probation because he provided truthful but uncooperative 
testimony would require that I adopt a degree of cynicism about the 
fundamental integrity [of] our criminal justice system which I will not 
entertain. 
Add "B" (Nehring Order at 2-3). Judge Nehring clearly perceived Petitioner's position as 
being a personal attack on Judge Frederick's character. That was the farthest thing from 
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Petitioner's intent. Certainly Petitioner does not believe that Judge Frederick is going to 
lash out at Chandler and revoke his probation merely because Chandler testified against 
the State's interests. Rather, the concern is that there has not been any determination in 
the Gibbons case as to Chandler's credibility, which is an issue that is central to the case. 
Certainly if Judge Frederick knows that Chandler is telling the truth, he would not revoke 
Chandler's probation for not "cooperating with law enforcement." Unfortunately, 
however, a determination of Chandler's credibility is a judgement call that the trial judge 
will be required to make. No one can guarantee Chandler that Judge Frederick will find 
him credible and find that he is telling the truth. That is not the nature of our system of 
justice. It is imperfect. Certainly Chandler has been informed that even if he tells the 
truth, there is a risk that Judge Frederick will not believe him. 
No one knows except Chandler whether he is telling the truth. Petitioner believes 
Chandler was telling the truth on April 15, 2002 when he testified that Lambert lied in 
the police report. The State presumably has a different view. Judge Frederick, sitting as 
the trial judge will be called upon to make that determination. If he finds Chandler not 
credible, he will likely find that Chandler has not cooperated with law enforcement and 
by extension that he is in violation of the terms of his probation. No one can say at this 
point in the proceedings whether Judge Frederick will find Chandler credible or not. 
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That judgement, if made at this juncture, would be premature and wholly inappropriate. 
That said, it must be decided at this juncture whether Judge Frederick should hear the 
Gibbons case in light of the complications that the Chandler testimony presents. 
F. CHANDLER'S APPREHENSION MAY FOLLOW HIM 
TO THE WITNESS STAND IN ANOTHER 
COURTROOM 
Judge Nehring wrote in his decision as follows: 
Moreover, even if Chandler is animated by the fear that his probation might 
be revoked, should he fail to cooperate with law enforcement, his 
apprehension would follow Mr. Chandler to the witness chair in the 
courtroom of any Third District Court judge. I am not persuaded that any 
'control' Judge Frederick might have over Mr. Chandler would be 
materially diminished by presenting his testimony before another judge.11 
Add. "B" (Nehring, Order at 3). In front of another judge, however, Chandler is likely to put 
the risks he faces out of his mind long enough to testify. The presence of Judge 
Frederick in the courtroom acts as a constant reminder of the precarious situation in 
which he finds himself and is likely to heighten his apprehension. The State knows this 
and has for that reason vigorously opposed Judge Frederick's disqualification. 
G. JUDGE NEHRING'S RELIANCE ONMCGEE 
SUGGESTS HE APPLIED THE WRONG STANDARD 
OF REVIEW 
Judge Nehring wrote in his decision as follows: 
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Here, the defendant's claim of bias and prejudice can be traced only to 
Judge Frederick's involvement with an anticipated witness who appeared 
before Judge Frederick on an unrelated case. The weakness of this claim 
for disqualification under Rule 29 is highlighted by the fact that our 
Supreme Court has approved the practice of permitting the same judge to 
preside over a defendant's preliminary hearing and trial. State of Utah v. 
McGee, 473 P.2d 388 (Utah 1970). In the course of hearing evidence in a 
preliminary hearing, a judge may be called upon to review the testimony of 
many witnesses directly implicated in the matter which the judge will 
revisit at trial. Clearly, if this practice has survived Supreme Court review, 
it is implausible to believe that Mr. Chandler's involvement in the Gibbons 
case would be found to be offensive. 
Add. "B" (Nehring, Order at 6-7). Judge Nehring's reliance on McGee further suggests that he 
was applying the wrong standard of review. McGee was seeking reversal of his 
conviction in the Supreme Court and thus, the prospective review standard would not 
have been applicable. Furthermore, the McGee case was decided long before the 
adoption of Canon 3(E)(1). In addition, the parties in McGee were the same and had the 
same interests during both the preliminary hearing and the trial. Petitioner, however, was 
not represented in the Chandler cases as he had no interest to protect at that time. 
While it is true that the Supreme Court found no error in McGee with the same 
judge presiding over the preliminary hearing and the trial, its reasoning was that since the 
judge sitting as magistrate over the preliminary hearing was not the finder of fact at trial, 
there was no risk of pre-formed opinions interfering with the fact finding at trial: 
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In regard to defendant's allegations of bias and prejudice, a hearing was 
held before Judge Cowley, who denied the motion. Defendant argued that 
Judge Mecham, as committing magistrate, heard the evidence and formed 
an opinion as to the truthfulness thereof. This matter was tried before a 
jury, who acted as the fact finders; and therefore, the opinion of the judge 
would be irrelevant. 
Id at 399. The Court's reasoning suggests that it would have been objectionable had the 
trier of fact been the judge in both instances. Such is the case in Gibbons. Judge 
Frederick was the finder of fact with regard to Chandler's credibility and character at 
sentencing in the Chandler cases. He will also be the finder of fact during pretrial 
evidentiary hearings in the Gibbons case, and Petitioner has the right to waive his right to 
a jury trial and have his case decided by the judge should he so choose to do so. 
For similar reasons, Judge Nehring's and the State's reliance on Liteky v. U.S., 
510 U.S. 540 (1994) and Carter v. Carter, 563 P.2d 177 (Utah 1977) was misplaced. See 
Add. "B" (Nehring, Order at 4) and Add. "A " (State's Opposition at 3). In both of those cases, the 
party alleging bias and prejudice was a party to the prior litigation. In Gibbons, 
Petitioner is a stranger to the Chandler proceedings and is being blocked from exploring 
the events that took place there other than from the transcript as a record of the 
proceedings. While the transcript may suffice as an official record of the proceedings, it 
is not a record of everything that went on since there were obviously discussions between 
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Chandler's counsel and the State, and possibly off-the-record discussions with Judge 
Frederick. Petitioner is in effect being told he should be satisfied with what he has which 
is nothing more than the cold record. 
VII RELIEF IS APPROPRIATE UNDER RULE 65B(dV2KA), (B) AND (D) 
When there is "no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy" available, appropriate 
relief may be granted: "(A) where an inferior court,..., has exceeded its jurisdiction or 
abused its discretion; (B) where an inferior court,..., has failed to perform an act 
required by law as a duty of office, trust or station; (C) where an inferior court,..., has 
refused the petitioner the use or enjoyment of a right... to which the petitioner is 
entitled." U.R.C.P. RULE 65B(d)(2). Where "the challenged proceedings are judicial in 
nature, the court's review shall not extend further than to determine whether the 
respondent has regularly pursued its authority." U.R.C.P. RULE 65B(d)(4). When the 
issue to be reviewed under Rule 65B involves a question of law, "the trial court's legal 
conclusion is granted no particular deference but is reviewed for correctness." Salt Lake 
Child and Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick. 890 P.2d 1017, 1019 (Utah 1995). 
"[W]hether a party's affidavit alleging judicial bias is legally sufficient is a question of 
law." In re M.L., 965 P.2d 551, 556 (Utah App. 1998). The Petitioner seeks relief 
under subsections (A), (B) and (C). 
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A ABUSE OF DISCRETION UNDER RULE 653(d)(2)(A) 
Under Rule 65B(d)(2)(A), this Court may "direct the particular exercise of a lower 
court's judgment to correct the lower court's abuse of discretion." Stirba, 972 P.2d at 
922. This Court has previously explained that an abuse of discretion occurs when a 
tribunal makes "a clear erroneous factual finding" or when it acts "unreasonably or 
misinterprets] the law." Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 27 (Utah 
App. 1991). The Utah Supreme Court has found an abuse of discretion warranting Rule 
65B(d)(2)(A) relief where the district court judge made an obvious legal error. 
Frederick, 890 P.2d at 1019-21. 
Rule 29 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is clear in the procedural steps it 
requires when an affidavit of bias is filed and since this Court's decision in State v. West 
the standard for determining legal sufficiency is obvious. 
There is very little or no discretion in whether to grant or deny a motion to 
disqualify since the 1997 adoption of Canon 3(E)(1). If Respondent exercised any 
discretion in reviewing Petitioner's affidavit of bias, relief is appropriate because Canon 
3(E)(1) dispensed with the discretionary standard and replaced it with a mandatory 
command by replacing the term "should" with the term "shall". The determination of 
legal sufficiency is purely a legal question and thus, not subject to the reviewing judge's 
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discretion. See U.R.C.P. RULE 65B(d)(2)(A); see SUPREME COURT RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE, CHPT 12 ("'shall' and 'shall not' impose binding obligations to 
respectively engage in or refrain from the described conduct.11); UTAH CONSTITUTION, 
ARTICLE VIII Section 4 & 12 (Supreme Court and Judicial Council rule making 
authority); U.C.J.C. CANON 1 ("An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable 
to justice in our society."); U.C.J.A, FORWORD at 1f 1 (1985 Article VIII amendments were 
to achieve the objectives of "the development of a more efficient and effective judicial 
system; the attraction and retention of quality judges; and the enhancement of the 
judiciary as a co-equal branch of government."). Unless it would be patently 
unreasonable to question the judge's impartiality, the reviewing judge must enter a 
disqualification order. 
B FAILURE TO PERFORM DUTY OF OFFICE RULE 65B(d)(2)(B) 
Since Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(E)(1) is also a statement of the 
duties and obligations of the office of district court judge, violation of Canon 3(E)(l)'s 
mandatory command falls within the standard set forth in Rule 65B(d)(2)(B) where an 
inferior court fails to perform an act required by law as a duty of office. Judge 
Frederick's refusal to disqualify himself was in violation of Canon 3(E)(1) and was 
therefore a failure to perform an act required by law as a duty of his office. 
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The procedures outlined in Rule 29 for reviewing the entire affidavit are clear, and 
the law setting the standard by which the affidavit must be reviewed is clear, and thus 
Judge Nehring's failure to follow both the procedure and the law was also a failure to 
perform an act required by law as a duty of his office. See also CANON 2 (judge's duty to 
uphold the law and integrity of the judicial system). 
C DENIAL OF CLEAR RIGHT UNDER R ULE 65B(d)(2)(C) 
Litigants are entitled to a judge who will hear both sides and decide an issue on 
the merits of the law and the evidence presented. Madsen v. Prudential Federal Savings 
& Loan Ass'n, 767 P.2d 538, 546 (Utah 1988). This includes the right to a judge who is 
free from the appearance of bias or partiality. In the criminal action below, Petitioner has 
a clearly established right to compel witnesses to testify on his behalf, the right to 
confront and cross examine witnesses, the right to investigate his case, the right to an 
impartial and neutral decision maker, and the right to a fair trial. The relief sought is 
appropriate under Rule 65B(d)(2)(C) because absent extraordinary relief, a panalopy of 
rights will be denied the Petitioner. The rights being denied are those core rights which 
have been recognized through out our legal tradition as being the basic building blocks 
of a civilized judicial system of justice. 
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VIII THE RULE 29 AFFIDAVIT WAS "LEGALLY SUFFICIENT" AS IT 
STATED FACTS THAT GIVE RISE TO THE APPEARANCE OF BIAS 
OR PREJUDICE, THAT SHOW ACTUAL IMPERMISSIBLE BIAS AND 
THAT SHOW AN UNACCEPTABLE RISK OF IMPERMISSIBLE BIAS 
A. Other Courts Have Required Disqualification Under Similar 
Circumstances 
Under similar circumstances as those here, judges have been disqualified for the 
appearance of bias or prejudice, actual bias or prejudice and because an unacceptable risk 
of impermissible bias existed. See State v. Martinez, - P.3d- 2002 WL 554484 (N.M.) 
(judge who presided over plea colloquy was disqualified from presiding over 
reconstruction hearing in order to facilitate "unhindered testimony" of his recollections 
of events at prior hearing); State v. Falcon, 793 A.2d 274, 277 (Conn. 2002) (judge 
involved in plea negotiations should disqualify for trial); State v. Baver, 656 N.E.2d 
1314, 1319-20 (Ohio App. 1995) (bias and prejudice may be evident from judge's harsh 
tenor and statements to defendant); State v. Fie. 356 S.E.2d 774, 775 (N.C. 1987) (judge 
could not sit in criminal contempt proceedings initiated as a result of events occurring in 
judge's courtroom in another case); Collins v. Dixie Transport. Inc., 543 So.2d 160, 166 
(Miss. 1989) (trial judge should have disqualified himself at hearing to determine what 
transpired during settlement reached in earlier proceeding when he participated over the 
proceedings and was called upon to make credibility determinations). 
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Judge Frederick has knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the 
proceeding and is a potential witness, which requires as a matter of law his 
disqualification: 
A judge shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the judge's 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances 
where: (a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a 
party's lawyer, a strong personal bias involving an issue in a case, or personal 
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding. . . . (d) the 
judge . . . (iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the 
proceeding. 
U.CJ.C. CANON 3(E)(1). Utah Code Annotated Section 78-24-3 authorizes calling a 
judge as a witness, and under those circumstances it is in the judge's discretion to 
postpone or suspend the trial in order to seat another judge. However, Rule 605 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence restricts a judge from testifying in a trial over which he or she 
presides. Thus, Canon 3(E)(1) forbids a judge from sitting in a case where he or she may 
be called upon to testify because of the potential for substantial disruption and harm to 
the process. 
Utah has a long tradition of judges disqualifying themselves upon the filing of an 
affidavit of bias and prejudice: 
The general practice in this jurisdiction has been forjudges to disqualify 
themselves whenever an affidavit of bias and prejudice against them has been 
filed. As a general rule, we think this is a commendable practice. The purity and 
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integrity of the judicial process ought to be protected against any taint of suspicion 
to the end that the public and litigants may have the highest confidence in the 
integrity and fairness of the courts. This is not to say that the mere filing of an 
affidavit of bias and prejudice, ipso facto cast such suspicion on the judge, and 
upon his integrity and fairness, that he ought to disqualify himself. However, it is 
ordinarily better for a judge to disqualify himself even though he may be entirely 
free of bias and prejudice if either litigant files an affidavit of bias and prejudice. 
'Next in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is that of doing 
it in such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness or integrity of the 
judge. 
State v. Bvington, 200 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1948) (decided under prior discretionary rule 
permitting challenged judge to determine bias and prejudice as in any other motion). The 
tradition was practiced by some but not all judges across the State, but with the adoption 
of Canon 3(E)(1), that informal tradition has become a mandatory duty. 
It is contrary to our Anglo-Saxon justice system to permit a judge familiar with the 
disputed events and persons to sit in judgement of those events and persons, and it does 
serious harm to the appearance of impartiality: "No man can serve as judge of his own 
case. . . . We doubt a more powerful principle may be found in our law. We have 
labeled it 'the ancient first principle of justice.' . . . The principle's power extends 
beyond the case of the judge-litigant to that of the judge-witness, to the case where the 
judge judges his own credibility as a player in the events whose truth is sought." Collins, 
543 So.2d at 166 & 167 n. 1 ("Our focus is upon the fact that the trial judge possessed 
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knowledge of the (non)occurrence of events critical to the credibility of Collin's 
witnesses and ultimately to divining the truth of those events."); Village of Exeter v. 
Kahler. 606 N.W.2d 862, 865 (Neb. App. 2000) (judge with knowledge of facts being 
adjudicated should disqualify); State v. Baird, 609 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Neb. 2000) ("A 
judge's taking the role of witness in trial before him or her is manifestly inconsistent with 
the judge's customary role of impartiality."); Vickers v. State, 17 S.W.3d 632, 636 (Mo. 
App. 2000) (judge who is witness to material facts compelled to recuse for fundamental 
fairness as guaranteed by state and federal due process clauses.). If Judge Frederick is 
called to testify, who will sit in judgement of his testimony? 
In State v. Bennett, 520 So.2d 1095 (La App. 1987), the Louisiana court held that 
the trial judge should have disqualified himself under circumstances similar to those at 
hand in this case. Id at 1097-98. There, Huey Long4 was indicted on charges related to 
crimes Bennett was later charged with for his involvement. Id. at 1096. "Long entered 
into a plea bargain agreement with the State whereby he agreed to provide information 
concerning the crimes and testify for the State in conjunction with any other prosecutions 
in return for a reduced charge and a lesser sentence." Id. Judge Broyles presided over 
the plea hearing, conducted the plea colloquy and accepted Long's plea of guilty along 
4Obviously not the populist governor of Louisiana. 
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with the conditions imposed by the agreement with the State. Id. Bennett was thereafter 
indicted. Id. Bennett subpoenaed Judge Broyles to testify as to the nature and terms of 
the agreement entered into by Long and the State, and accepted by the court. IdL Bennett 
moved to disqualify Broyles but the judge reviewing the affidavit denied the motion 
finding Judge Broyles not to be a material witness. Id. The Louisiana Court of Appeals 
granted review and ordered Judge Broyles recused from the case: 
The thrust of the defendant's argument is that the plea bargain agreement between 
the State's chief witness, Huey Long, and the prosecution will affect the 
credibility of that witness; the defendant is therefore entitled to attack Mr. Long's 
credibility by exposing the plea bargain agreement at trial; that since Broyles 
presided over the guilty plea hearing, accepted the agreement between the State 
and Mr. Long, and agreed himself to be bound by it, Judge Broyles is a material 
witness and will be called to testify about the plea bargain. 
The plea agreement entered into between Judge Broyles, the assistant district 
attorney and Huey P. Long imposes a limit on the judge's power to sentence 
Long, if Long fulfills the obligations under the agreement. Long's obligations 
under the agreement will be fulfilled by his testimony at defendant's trial. Long 
will not be sentenced until after the trial. Therefore the control which Judge 
Broyles has over Long's testimony has a direct bearing on Judge Broyles' ability 
to conduct a fair and impartial trial. 
Moreover, since Judge Broyles is scheduled to testify as a witness as to the details 
of the plea agreement, which is material to the issue of credibility of Long's 
testimony against defendant, someone will have to fulfill the role of ruling on the 
questions which are propounded to Judge Broyles. It would not be feasible for 
Judge Broyles to sit in the witness's chair and the judge's chair at the same time. 
. . This also affects Judge Broyles' ability to conduct a fair and impartial trial. 
Therefore we find that, under the particular facts of this case, Judge Broyles must 
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be recused under LSA-C.Cr.P. art 671(6). 
Id at 1097-98. 
For the same reasons Judge Broyles could not act as trial judge in Bennett's case, 
Judge Frederick cannot act as trial judge in the case against Petitioner. The control 
which Judge Frederick has over Chandler has a direct bearing on Judge Frederick's 
ability to conduct a fair and impartial trial. Chandler testified in the case at hand that he 
had entered into an agreement with the State to cooperate with law enforcement and that 
Judge Frederick made that cooperation a condition of his probation. During the 
sentencing, Judge Frederick made it very clear to Chandler that any violation of the terms 
of his probation would result in Chandler going to prison. Add "A", Rule 29Aff. at 3^13 (Ex. C 
at 13%W5-19) ("at the drop of a hat"). Chandler testified in Gibbons that he was "bordering on 
nervous to scared to death" because he felt it might be interpreted by Wissler that he was 
not cooperating with law enforcement. He explained that he felt he was "extremely 
vulnerable for telling the truth here." Add "A ", Rule 29 Aff. (Ex. D at 128 1ffli0-2i;. 
B. It Just So Happens That It Looks Bad 
In Gibbons, it just so happened that two of the absolutely critical witnesses, 
Chandler and Wilson, were prosecuted by Wissler representing the State. It just so 
happened that Wissler is the State's attorney prosecuting Petitioner. It just so happened 
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that she entered into plea agreements with both Chandler and Wilson to cooperate with 
law enforcement in their investigations. It just so happened that for ten months Wissler 
denied the existence of any agreements between the State and any of the witnesses or 
informants involved in the case and its investigation. It just so happened that both 
Chandler and Wilson had in fact agreed as part of their respective plea bargains to 
cooperate with Detective Lambert in his investigations. It just so happened that 
Detective Lambert attributed statements to Chandler, Wilson and Morgan that were 
incriminating of Petitioner. It just so happened that each deny having made those 
statements. It also just so happened that the judge assigned to hear Petitioner's case is 
the same judge who heard the three cases against Chandler wherein the disputed plea 
agreement took place. 
It just so happened that despite the fact that Chandler was charged with three first 
degree felonies with enhancements, a second degree felony and six third degree felonies, 
Judge Frederick accepted a plea to one first degree felony and two second degree 
felonies and placed him on probation for twenty four months with little explanation from 
the State other than that Chandler would be able to provide educational services to the 
community about the dangers of club drugs if he were given probation. See Add "A" Rule 
29Aff. Ex. Cat 9-13. 
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Petitioner did not orchestrate this situation. He has just persistently tried to bring 
it to light. The bottom line is that it looks bad for Judge Frederick to sit as the trial judge 
in the Gibbons case-one which has received an incredible amount of media attention 
from coast to coast. It looks bad for the integrity of the judiciary. See U.C.J.ADMIN., 
FORWARD, 1f 1 (objectives to be achieved by adoption of U.C.J.Admin). It looks bad for 
the Petitioner who just wants a fair hearing of the issues in his case without information 
that he has been denied access to interfering with the trial court's decisions and the 
testimony of an important witness. It looks bad for the State of Utah at a time when the 
public nationwide is becoming more and more concerned with abusive police practices. 
There have been numerous reasons set forth by Petitioner as to why Judge 
Frederick should be disqualified from hearing the Gibbons case and numerous arguments 
made by the State and Judge Nehring as to why Petitioner is not entitled to disqualify 
Judge Frederick. No one has given one good reason why it is necessary given the 
particular circumstances of this unique case that Judge Frederick sit as the trial judge. 
Neither the State nor the Petitioner have a right to any particular judge; only to an 
impartial judge.5 Petitioner is not judge shopping. He just wants a judge who has no 
5Certainly the State would be seeking disqualification if the Gibbons case had 
been assigned to Judge Brian who handled the sentencing of Rian Wilson or to Judge 
Atherton who reviewed the warrant affidavit and signed the warrant. That situation 
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pre-formed opinions as to Chandler's credibility and who will not be a continuous 
reminder to Chandler that if he is perceived by Wissler and Judge Frederick as not 
having cooperated with law enforcement, he is going to prison. 
The only reason that has been put forth for not disqualifying Judge Frederick is 
that doing so would encourage judge shopping. That argument rings hollow in this very 
unique case that has been described by the Salt Lake Tribune as being the "convoluted 
drug and child endangerment prosecution." Add "F" It is a rare case, thankfully, where 
the defendant produces strong evidence that the prosecutor assisted a police officer in 
making misrepresentations to the magistrate in order to secure a search warrant. When 
that happens, the stakes are raised considerably as they have been in this case both in 
terms of the parties and in terms of the public's perception of our criminal justice system. 
A prosecutor representing the State of Utah may have aided another in committing 
perjury in order to secure the search warrant in the Gibbons case. That same prosecutor 
has it within her authority and discretion to file an order to show cause against Chandler 
to revoke his probation if he does not "cooperate with law enforcement." That is within 
her discretion and there is little anyone else can do if she decides upon that course, and 
would likely create a serious concern for Wissler since she told each within a short 
period of time two opposite stories about the credibility and reliability of Rian Wilson. 
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there have been no assurances from the State that that will not happen. 
Whether Judge Frederick, Wissler and Chandler's attorney engaged in an off-the-
record discussion regarding the nature and terms of the plea agreement which might 
color Judge Frederick's determination of Chandler's credibility has not been 
substantiated one way or the other by the record. The State had opportunity to do so and 
did not do so. Judge Nehring under Rule 29(c)(3)(B) had opportunity to do so and did 
not do so. While the State represented to Judge Nehring that "the entirety of the State's 
agreement made known to Judge Frederick is contained in the court record transcripts," 
Add. "A" (State's Response at 10), that representation is undercut by the leniency of Chandler's 
sentencing and probation terms given the serious nature of the crimes, and by the fact 
that Judge Frederick reviewed a sentencing report which has not been produced to 
Petitioner in discovery. The common practice is for AP&P to assess credibility, 
determine the plea agreement, and make recommendations to the judge for sentencing. 
Common practice is for the sentencing judge to assess credibility of the person before 
imposing sentence: the defendant stands before the sentencing court swearing he will 
never sin again. Should he be believed? It belies common sense and experience to say 
that Judge Frederick did not assess Chandler's credibility and that in doing so he was not 
provided ample information about Chandler. 
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If Judge Frederick determines in the Gibbons case that Chandler is or is not 
credible depending upon how he testifies later on in the Gibbons case, it certainly 
anticipates Judge Frederick's actions in the Chandler cases should Wissler seek to 
revoke Chandler's probation. Chandler is represented by competent counsel and 
certainly he has been told by his attorney that this is the situation he faces. Perhaps that 
shades his testimony, perhaps it does not, but the risk is substantial and no one has made 
any assurances to the Petitioner that Chandler will not change his testimony in order to be 
perceived by the State as "cooperating with law enforcement." 
Similarly, no one has made any assurances that there were no off-the-record 
discussions with Judge Frederick regarding the nature and terms of the agreement 
between Chandler and the State. While Judge Nehring cited Rule 11(h)(1) as a basis for 
his confidence that no off-the-record discussion took place involving Judge Frederick, 
the common practice in the Third District is for both parties to approach the judge in 
certain cases prior to entering into a plea agreement in order to get some indication 
whether the judge would accept the terms of the contemplated agreement. 
It is also common to approach the judge off the record to discuss matters relating 
to defendants acting as confidential informants. Had the issue of such practice been 
brought to Petitioner's attention by either Judge Nehring or the State, Petitioner could 
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have directed Judge Nehring to the record of State of Utah v. Rian Wilson, District 
Court Case No. 001910594, which has been made part of the record in the Gibbons case. 
The certified copy of the videotape of the proceedings in the Wilson case, marked as 
Defendant's Exhibit No. 7 to the transcript of the April 11,2002 hearing in the Gibbons 
case, shows Wissler as well as other attorneys for the State repeatedly approaching the 
judges to discuss Wilson acting as an informant for the State. Add. "D" (copy of video).6 
Thus, it does happen and if it happened in the Chandler cases, Petitioner has a 
constitutionally guaranteed right to inquire into those discussions. As the situation 
stands, it is quite probable that such a discussion did take place and the Petitioner is 
being denied even the opportunity to know about it because the State has not been 
forthcoming and Petitioner cannot interview Judge Frederick. See UTAH RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 3.5(C) (barring ex parte communication with judge 
concerning the merits). If such a discussion did take place, and Judge Frederick is not 
disqualified, Petitioner is going to be denied the right to exculpatory evidence, the right 
to cross examination, the right to call witnesses on his behalf to testify, and the right to 
have his case heard by an impartial judge — all of which are fundamental rights 
6The copy that has been submitted as Add. "D" is not a certified copy. The 
certified copy has been made part of the record and is therefore with Judge Frederick 
along with the rest of the record. 
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guaranteed under Article I Section 12 of the Utah Constitution and the due process 
clauses of the United States Constitution. 
No matter from what angle it is approached, Judge Frederick sitting as the trial 
judge in Gibbons looks bad. For the sake of appearances, at the very least, he should be 
disqualified and another judge assigned. 
IX CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Petitioner respectfully asks this Court to direct 
respondent to enter an order requiring Judge Frederick disqualified. 
X REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
The Petitioner requests the matter be set for oral argument as soon as possible 
after the response time, seven days, permitted by Rule 19(c), U.R.A.P.. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J £ day of May, 2000. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, Darwin Overson, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered an 
original and four copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 S. State, 5th 
Floor, P.O. Box 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230; one copy to the Salt Lake 
County Prosecutors Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; one copy to 
the Honorable Judge Ronald Nehring, Third Judicial District Court, 450 South State 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and one copy to the Honorable Judge J. Dennis 
Federick, Third Judicial District Court, 450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111. 
50 
